Abstract. NTRU is an efficient public-key cryptosystem proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman. Assuming access to a decryption oracle, we show ways to recover the private key of NTRU systems that do not include a ciphertext validating procedure. The strongest of our methods will employ just a single call to the oracle, and in all cases, the number of calls needed will be small enough to be realistic.
Introduction
NTRU cryptosystem( [2] ), introduced during the rump session of Crypto'96, is one of the most efficient public key cryptosystem now available. Because the encryption/decryption process of this system involves polynomials with small coefficients, it is quite fast compared to systems like RSA, ElGamal, or ECC. It also require only a small amount of memory and hence is suitable for constrained environments like smart cards, PDAs, and mobile phones. The NTRU cryptosystem is currently being considered by standards bodies( [1, 6] ).
In Crypto 2000, E. Jaulmes and A. Joux ( [7] ) showed that a chosen ciphertext attack on NTRU could succeed probabilistically. Reaction attacks( [4] ) were also presented on NTRU. To counter-measure these attacks, various padding schemes were proposed( [3, 5] ). Later, P. Nguyen and D. Pointcheval( [8] ) showed that there were weakness in the padding schemes proposed by the NTRU company and suggested a method which is claimed to be IND-CCA.
In this paper, we show how to obtain the private key of the NTRU cryptosystem, assuming access to an Unconditionally Decrypting Oracle. We define a UDO to be an oracle that returns a decryption of any given ciphertext without checking its validity as a ciphertext. Access to a UDO could be realistic if, for some reason, the ciphertext validating procedure was incorrectly implemented. For example, when implementing NTRU-REACT ( [8] ), unlike other padding schemes, it is easy to leave out the ciphertext validation procedure. This situation could also be possible if the implementer just left it out with ill intentions.
Under the UDO assumption, we show ways to deterministically recover the private key of NTRU cryptosystem. The first of our methods applies to the original NTRU system as given in [2] . Let N be the NTRU parameter defining the working ring size. Using O(N 2 ) calls to the UDO, we can always recover the private key. We can also recover the private key, with probability of failure less than 1/2 90 , using less than 2N calls to the UDO. We show three more methods that apply to optimized NTRU ( [1, 3, 6] ). To the best of our knowledge, the present work is the first in acknowledging attacks specific to the optimized version of NTRU. All three of the methods will recover the private key completely. Of the three, the last one we shall present(Section 6) is the strongest, using just a single UDO call. Thus, the NTRU cryptosystem should never be used without a proper padding scheme.
If the use of a UDO were possible on some (flawed) implementation of RSA-OAEP or the Cramer-Shoup scheme, we would no longer be sure of their IND-CCA2 property. But contrary to the NTRU situation presented by this work, nothing is known in the direction of key recovery attacks on the RSA or ElGamal primitive. This suggests that we should still be very careful in the use of NTRU cryptosystem.
Overview of the NTRU cryptosystem
The NTRU cryptosystem has gone through some changes since its first appearance. To set the grounds of our discussion, we quickly present various parameters and encryption/decryption processes for three versions of it. The readers may refer to [2] and [1, 3] for more information. The reference [10] is also helpful in understanding why the decryption process works.
Let N be an odd prime. We will be working over the ring R = Z[x]/(x N − 1). The ring R is identified with the set of integer polynomials of degree less than N . Multiplication in R is denoted by * .
The sets L f , L g , L r , and L m , to be fixed below for each version, are subsets of R. Two parameters p and q are chosen so that they are relatively prime and the private key f ∈ L f is taken so that it is invertible modulo q. The inverse will be denoted by f q , and using a random polynomial g ∈ L g the public key is set to h ≡ p * f q * g (mod q).
To encrypt a message m ∈ L m , we choose a random r ∈ L r and compute
The decryption process is more involved and explained below for each version of NTRU. Let us fix one notation before doing this. Given m, n ∈ Z and t ∈ R, define Mod t n (m) to be the unique integer in the interval (t− n 2 , t+ n 2 ] congruent to m modulo n. For a polynomial f (x) ∈ R, we may similarly define Mod t n (f (x)), by applying it to the coefficients.
Original version
In the original version [2] , the parameter p is fixed to be 3. When choosing a private key f , it is also required to have a modulo p = 3 inverse f p . We define
to be the set of polynomials in R with d + coefficients equal to 1, d − coefficients equal to −1, and all other coefficients equal to 0. Table 1 lists the various parameters as originally given in [2] . The message space L m is set to all polynomials in R with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}.
To decrypt a ciphertext e, we go through the following process.
Return Mod
We say that a wrapping has occurred during the decryption process if a = f * e, i.e., the Mod 0 q operation has changed at least one coefficient. Notice that even though e is defined only up to modulo q, when we use e as an input to the decryption machine, an explicit representative of e will be used. Hence this equation makes sense as an equation in R.
Binary-F version
Set p = x + 2. The private key space L f is taken to be polynomials of the form
with F a binary polynomial having d F -many nonzero coefficients. The sets L g and L r are to contain binary polynomials with d g and d r coefficients equal to 1, respectively. The message space L m is the set of all binary polynomials in R. Table 2 lists parameters as given in [1] .
Given a ciphertext e, the decryption process goes through the following steps.
Here, the Mod p operation chooses a representative of a in a binary polynomial form. We refer the readers to [3] for more detail.
As before, we say that a wrapping has occurred during decryption if a = f * e.
Low Hamming weight-F version
This version of NTRU is identical to the previous binary-F version except that the polynomial F used in defining the private key f is of the form
with each F i a binary polynomial having d Fi -many nonzero coefficients. The parameter values are given in Table 2 . Notice that When we want to refer to both the binary-F and LHW-F versions of NTRU at the same time, we shall use the phrase optimized NTRU. 
in [1, 6, 10] . This may seem different from what is done in step 1. Furthermore, in this form, knowledge of the secrete information f q also seems to be required. But both are calculating the same value m(1), assuming that it is close to 
Adaptive use of wrapping behavior
We shall work with the original NTRU setting (Section 2.1) in this section. While the arguments of this section may be modified and applied to other settings, it is better explained in the original setting and does not involve the use of special forms for the private key f that appears in other settings.
We show how to exploit the wrapping behavior of the modulo q reduction process done during decryption to recover the private key, using less than 2N calls to the decryption oracle.
Descriptive argument
We assume that we have access to a decryption oracle and may distinguish whether or not a wrapping has occurred during the decryption process. For example, this could be possible, in some situations, through timing techniques. This could also be possible if we may obtain the decrypted message, since the decrypted output of ciphertext e is equal to Mod 0 p (e) if and only if no wrapping has occurred.
We first remark that any cyclic shift f * x i of the private key f may work as a decryption key. The cyclic shift added to a during the first step of decryption is removed when f p is applied in the second step.
Consider what would happen if we ran the ciphertext
through the decryption oracle. Recall that the coefficients of f all belong to the set {−1, 0, 1}. Hence wrapping occur if and only if there exists some consecutive run of coefficients in f equal to the sequence (1, 1, 1, −1, 1), in reverse order. Suppose we do have wrapping for the above particular e. We may then run
through the decryption oracle. If either one brings a wrapping behavior, we may continue, knowing a longer consecutive sequence of coefficients from f . If neither returns a wrapping behavior, we know neither (1, 1, 1,
is a consecutive run of coefficients from f (in reverse order). But we know the shorter subsequence (1, 1, 1, −1, 1) is present in f , so the sequence (1, 1, 1, −1, 1, 0) must be present in f . We may then use
to find the next coefficient of f . We can continue with this process until we know a consecutive sequence of coefficients from f that contains q 2 -many ±1's. So, for Case A of Table 1 , this process obtains some cyclic shift of f completely.
To cope with the other two cases given in Table 1 , let us go back and suppose that e given by (5) induces a wrapping so that (1, 1, 1, −1, 1) appears as a consecutive run of coefficients in f . Let us also assume that q 2 = 5. Then we cannot use e± given by (6) since they are both just equal to e. But, if we can assume that the probability of the subsequence (1, 1, 1, −1) appearing in f more than once is negligible, we can use
to find the next coefficient. The probability of some sequence of length n appearing in f more than once is at most Hence, we can obtain a cyclic shift of f , which in turn can be used later to find the plain text m corresponding to any given ciphertext e.
We have included a complete example of this approach in Appendix A.
Algorithm
We summarize arguments of the previous subsection in an algorithm.
Algorithm 1
, and integer w as follows. 
This algorithm obtains some cyclic shift of f using 2N − d + − 1 calls to the decryption oracle. Probability of this algorithm returning a wrong value of f is at most N/3 q 2 −1 . Remark 3. Using ideas present in this algorithm, it is possible construct an algorithm that returns a cyclic shift of f deterministically without failure. But the algorithm would use O(N 2 ) calls to the decryption oracle and become much more complex.
Pre-designed wrapping (non-adaptive use)
This section will deal with recovering the private key f when it is given in the form (3). So it covers both of the optimized NTRU versions(Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
We shall assume access to decrypted output of ciphertexts of our choice. The ciphertexts to be inserted in the machine will be determined from the public key through pre-computation and does not depend on previous output of the decryption oracle. The number of queries to the decryption machine needed is less than twice the size of the coefficient set for f . If the coefficient set for f is small, the number of queries needed could be much smaller. We shall recover f completely.
The method
We shall use a concrete example in explaining a method for recovering the private key. Take the value N = 251 and q = 128 from Table 2 and assume that the coefficient set of f is {0, 1, 2}. Application of this method to situations when the coefficient set is bigger will be straightforward. We propose to run the constant polynomial e = e (for some 0 ≤ e < q) through the decryption machine. As stated by Remark 1, given e and a specific public key h, anybody may find the value A. Let us fix a public key h and write A(e) to denote the value A corresponding to the constant polynomial e = e.
For the parameter values given in the N = 251 row of Table 2 we can calculate
With this, we can find the I and A values for various e = e. Gather terms of the private key f according to their coefficients and write
The coefficients of f * e will belong to the set {0, e, 2e}. Below, we have drawn their position relative to A(e) for some chosen e values.
• e = 24, A(e) 138.04 Let us fix e = 63 and follow through the decryption steps with the help of the above drawing.
a(e) = Mod
Let us do this once more with e = 105.
We may observe that the difference of the outputs from the decryption machine satisfies
≡ a(e) − a(e ) (mod p)
Denote the modulo p inverse of q by q p so that q p · q ≡ 1 (mod p). We may now obtain
We stress that all three equalities above are true equalities in the ring R. They are stronger than just modulo p equivalence relations. The last equality follows since f 0 is a binary polynomial. We have found all terms of f having coefficients equal to 0 with just two queries to the decryption machine. The above argument obtained f 0 because the value 0 crossed over the value A − 3q 2 as we changed e to e and since neither e nor 2e went over any Mod A q operation boundary. If we work with e = 24 and e = 63, we can similarly obtain f 2 . The remaining terms will now have coefficient equal to 1 and we have found the private key f with just three queries to the decryption machine.
Remark 4.
In the above calculations, we've used the fact f ≡ 1 (mod p). Hence this attack is not applicable to the original NTRU cryptosystem.
Feasibility of this approach
We shall use the notation
for any integer n and centering value A. An equivalent definition would be
It measures how far n is from the representative interval. When the value A is clear from context, dc(n) will be used. Let the coefficient set of f be {0, 1, . . . , t}. To argue that the previous section is a meaningful attack on un-padded version of optimized NTRU, it remains to consider how likely it is to find an (e, e ) pair with dc(i · e, A(i · e)) and dc(i · e , A(i · e )) differing at just one 0 ≤ i ≤ t. We have no proof that enough such pairs may always be found, but will give an informal argument showing that this is highly possible. Also, a complete solution for the N = 251 case is provided in the Appendices as an example.
Examine what happens to the dc-values when we increase e by just 1. If we study the procedure for calculating A(e), we find that setting e ← e + 1 increases A(e), in most cases (exception occurs when I goes over the modulo q boundary), by
N . For the parameter values given in Table 2 , this value is roughly 0.86 (N = 251), 0.56 (N = 347), and 2.51 (N = 503) for each case. Of course, setting e ← e + 1 increase i · e by the amount i. We want to point out that not all t + 1 of these values i can be close to
N at the same time. The second point we want to make is that, as we change e from 0 to q − 1, the values i · e all start as being equal to 0 and end up spreading out over an interval of length t · q. So the t + 1 dc-values will start out as the same and end up as different.
These two points convince us that not all of the dc-values can stay constant over the change of e from 0 to q − 1.
Finally, we want to call to attention one more point. Since the distance between i · e and (i + 1) · e is less than q, if e is big enough, it is almost impossible (again, the same exception apply) for two adjacent dc-values to change simultaneously, as we increase e by 1. Non-adjacent dc-values have a better chance of changing simultaneously, but since they have to be apart by a multiple of q for this to happen, this is not too frequent.
If this does not convince the reader, we can just roughly say that we have about q equations in hand to solve for t + 1 variables.
For the case N = 251, we have given a table of dc-values in Appendix B. As we have already seen, for the parameter values given in the first row of Table 2 , we have r(1)h(1) = 64. Notice that the maximum possible value for the coefficient of f , in either the binary-F or the LHW-F case, is 28 = 3 · (8 + 1) + 1. So, for each e = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1, we've listed the values dc(i · e, A(i · e)) for i = 0, 1, . . . , 28.
In Appendix C, we used these values to give an explicit instruction for determining the private key f completely with 52 queries to the decryption machine. In practice, we do not expect f to contain coefficients as large as 28. So the process would be a lot shorter.
If the coefficient set of f is just {0, 1, 2, 3}, which is highly probable in the binary-F case, Appendix D explains how one could obtain f completely with just one or two queries to the decryption machine.
In this section, we assume the private key is given by a binary-F(Section 2.2). We present a chosen-ciphertext attack which makes one query to the decryption machine and recovers the private key completely.
Let us denote the modulo q inverse of p by p q , so that p q * p ≡ 1 (mod q).
If q = 2 k , we may specifically set
Simple case
If we insert p q into the decryption machine, it will calculate
Since all the coefficients of F are either 0 or 1, with high probability, we will have
Assume for the moment that this is true. Then, we have
Notice that the first term on the left is the output of the decryption machine, and that the second term on the left may readily be computed. Hence we may obtain
The second equality holds, since F is a binary polynomial. We have obtained the private key f = 1 + p * F with just one query.
Remark 5. This attack obviously relies on the form of the private key f = 1 + p * F. Hence this attack may not be applied to the original NTRU scheme. Table 2 , we have calculated various values. So at least, for the parameter values given in Table 2 , equation (11) is always satisfied.
It remains to justify equation (11). For parameters given in
N f (1) f q (1) r(1)h(1) p q (1) I(p q ) A(p q ) 251
Wrapping case
Assumption of the previous subsection, namely, equation (11), fails if and only if
1. some coefficient c of Mod
. and the corresponding coefficient of F is equal to 1.
Since we know the exact polynomial Mod
A q (p q ), we know which coefficients satisfy the first of the above conditions. Suppose some coefficient c i of the x i term in Mod A q (p q ) satisfies both conditions. Suppose further, for the moment, that such a coefficient is unique. Then
And the output of the decryption machine satisfies
As before, we may obtain the private key by computing
In conclusion, if p q contains t-many coefficients satisfying the above condition 1, with just one query to the decryption machine, we may find 2 t candidates for F, one of which corresponds to the true private key f = 1 + p * F.
Remark 6. If q = 2
k , we know from equation (10) that all of the coefficients of p q are distinct modulo q. (Read next remark to see why this isn't strictly true.) Hence there can be at most one coefficient satisfying the first of the above two conditions. Remark 7. In the q = 2 k case, if it happens that some coefficient c ≡ 0 (mod q) satisfies the first condition, application of this method is not feasible. But with some modifications we could use −p q or even 2p q in a similar attack.
Uniform wrapping (using the public key h)
This section contains the simplest, and perhaps, the strongest of our attacks on un-padded NTRU. Using just one query to the decryption machine, we shall obtain completely, the binary polynomial g used in defining the public key, with probability (q − 1)/q. Since the public key is given by h = p * f q * g, this is (almost) equivalent to having obtained the private key f .
As before, let p q be the modulo q inverse of p. We run e = p q * h through the decryption machine. The output of the machine will be
Recall the notation (9). With probability (q−1)/q, we can expect to have dc(0) = dc (1) . For the parameter values of Table 2 , we may easily check that they are equal. (1) Assume dc(0) = dc(1) and let d denote this common value. Set
Then, we may write Mod
and we may obtain
from just one query to the decryption machine. The value
is in our hands. Now, if h is invertible modulo q, or equivalently, if g is invertible modulo q, we can obtain f modulo q. We know the form of f , so can find f exactly. Furthermore, the random binary polynomial g is invertible with a very high probability. Even if it is not, we still have the possibility of using a pseudo inverse of h to obtain f . Remark 8. Arguments of this section cannot be applied to the original NTRU scheme. Fundamentally, this approach is only possible because in the optimized version of NTRU, we have f p = 1 and hence the process of multiplying f p to a, present in the original scheme, is no longer carried out. Simplifying the decryption process has opened up a new weakness in NTRU.
Remark 9. In the case dc(0) = dc(1), we may use −p q * h in a similar attack. Again, we have about 1/q chance of encountering the same problem.
Remark 10. Suppose dc(0) = dc(1), or equivalently, dc(0) + 1 = dc(1). We may write g = 0 · g 0 + 1 · g 1 with S(x) = g 0 + g 1 . Then
Hence, if 1 − q is invertible modulo p in R, we may find g. This is true for the values N = 251 with q = 128 and N = 347 with q = 128.
Conclusion
We've seen four chosen-ciphertext attacks applicable to un-padded versions of NTRU cryptosystem.
The first of these, given in Section 3, is an improvement to previous reaction attacks. It applies to the most general NTRU cryptosystem and uses less than 2N queries to the decryption oracle.
The approaches of the next three sections apply to optimized versions of NTRU. In Section 4, we pre-compute wrappings to be expected in the decryption process and use differences of these wrappings to recover the private key. A very small number of queries to the decryption oracle was needed. Other two approaches presented here, given in Section 5 and Section 6, uses just one query to the decryption machine to recover the private key completely, under realistic parameter values. These three methods depend on the private key being of the form f = 1+p * F. None of these three attacks on optimized NTRU are applicable to the original NTRU cryptosystem. By giving special forms for the private key, the key generation and decryption processes of NTRU cryptosystem became simpler. But at the same time, it has opened new ways of recovering the private key.
The number of decryption oracle use needed in approaches of this paper is small enough to be realistic. Hence NTRU should never be used without some form of padding, protecting it from chosen ciphertext attacks.
However, we believe any reasonable padding scheme will provide the optimized NTRU cryptosystem protection from our attacks. Of course, with explicit hash functions chosen to be used in the padding schemes, the story could be different. This part still remains to be considered.
A Adaptive use of wrapping -Example
We give an example of the approach given in Section 3. Let the parameters and private key be as follows.
(N, p, q) = (11, 3, 32),
We referred to [10] for the above NTRU parameter. Other parameters like g or h will not be needed. We first try the ciphertext
With this, the intermediate polynomial a = f * e will be a = 16, 14, −16, −15, 1, 15, −1, −15, 0, −1, −14
We have written down just the coefficients of a for ease of writing. Since a 2 = −16 ≤ q 2 , we will observe a wrapping. Thus, we know that, among the coefficients f i of f , there exist a t such that (f t , f t−1 ) = (1, 1). In this case, the real value of t is 2, but we don't have access to this information. Anyway, we set a polynomial f = 1, 1 to be a candidate polynomial for the private key.
Next, we try the ciphertext e = −1 − x − ( q 2 − 2)x = −1, −1, −14
Then, a = f * e = −12, 14, 12, −15, −13, 1, 13, −1, −14, −1 .
This will not cause a wrapping, which implies that there is no t such that f t , f t−1 , f t−2 is equal to 1, 1, 1 . We next try the ciphertext e = −1 − x + (q/2 − 2)x = −1, −1, 14 .
Then, we have a = 16, −14, −16, 13, 15, 1, −15, −1, 14, −1 .
This causes a wrapping to occur, which is due to (f 2 , f 1 , f 0 ) being equal to (1, 1, −1). Although we don't have access to the exact value of a, we know from the existence of wrapping that there is a t such that (f t , f t−1 , f t−2 ) = (1, 1, −1).
We now set f = 1, 1, −1 as a candidate for the private key. In this way, we construct ciphertexts from the candidate polynomial and try them step by step to recover the whole coefficients of the private key. Table 3 shows a summary of this process.
When we reach step 17 of Table 3 , we reverse the candidate polynomial f . That is, we set f i = f N −i−1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
Then, we get the polynomial f * x 8 = 0, −1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, −1, −1, 1, 1 , which may be used in place of the real f to decrypt any given ciphertext.
B dc-value list -Example
We have used N = 251, q = 128, and d 
